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Abstract
This paper introduces the logic of evidence and truth LETF as an
extension of the Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic FDE. LETF is a slightly
modified version of the logic LETJ , presented in Carnielli and Rodrigues
(2017). While LETJ is equipped only with a classicality operator ○, LETF
is equipped with a non-classicality operator ● as well, dual to ○. Both
LETF and LETJ are logics of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness
in which the operator ○ recovers classical logic for propositions in its scope.
Evidence is a notion weaker than truth in the sense that there may be
evidence for a proposition α even if α is not true. As well as LETJ ,
LETF is able to express preservation of evidence and preservation of truth.
The primary aim of this paper is to propose a probabilistic semantics
for LETF where statements P (α) and P (○α) express, respectively, the
amount of evidence available for α and the degree to which the evidence
for α is expected to behave classically – or non-classically for P (●α).
A probabilistic scenario is paracomplete when P (α) + P (¬α) < 1, and
paraconsistent when P (α) + P (¬α) > 1, and in both cases, P (○α) < 1.
If P (○α) = 1, or P (●α) = 0, classical probability is recovered for α. The
proposition ○α ∨ ●α, a theorem of LETF , partitions what we call the
information space, and thus allows us to obtain some new versions of
known results of standard probability theory.
∗The authors acknowledge support from the National Council for Scientific and Techno-
logical Development (CNPq, Brazil) under research grants 311911/2018-8, 308077/2018-0,
and 307376/2018-4. The first author has also been supported by the CNPq fellowship grant
204479/2017-71 for a research stay at the University of Oxford, 2018. The authors owe a
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1 Introduction1
In Carnielli and Rodrigues (2017) two paraconsistent and paracomplete formal2
systems were presented, the Basic Logic of Evidence (BLE) and the Logic of3
Evidence and Truth (LETJ). BLE ends up being equivalent to Nelson’s well-4
known logic N4 but has been conceived to express preservation of evidence5
instead of truth. Scenarios with conflicting evidence – that is, non-conclusive6
evidence for the truth and the falsity of α – as well as scenarios with no evi-7
dence at all about α are possible, so neither explosion nor excluded middle hold8
in BLE. LETJ is an extension of BLE equipped with a classicality operator9 ○. When ○α holds, classical negation – and so full classical logic – for α is recov-10
ered. According to the intended interpretation, ○α in LETJ means that there11
is conclusive evidence for the truth or falsity of α, so the truth-value of α has12
been established as true or false.13
Let us call ⊢C and ⊢BLE , respectively, the relation of logical consequence in14
classical logic and in BLE. Classical consequence is defined in terms of preserva-15
tion of truth: Γ ⊢C α just in case there is no model M such that all propositions16
of Γ are true in M , but α is not true in M. The intended interpretation of17
BLE, on the other hand, is not based on preservation of truth, but rather on18
preservation of evidence: Γ ⊢BLE α means that the availability of evidence for19
the premises in Γ implies that there is also evidence available for α. Classical20
logic and BLE, therefore, express different properties of propositions: truth and21
availability of evidence. The logic LETJ , in its turn, is able to express preserva-22
tion of evidence and preservation of truth – it ‘combines’, in one and the same23
formal system, the relations ⊢C and ⊢BLE . The operator ○ works like a context24
switch that divides propositions into those that have a classical and those that25
have a non-classical behavior, and BLE is the underlying logic of the latter.26
Adequate valuation semantics and decision procedures for BLE and LETJ27
have been proposed. These semantics, however, are only able to express the fact28
that a given proposition α has or does not have evidence available by attributing,29
respectively, the semantic value 1 or 0 to α. Evidence, thus, is treated from a30
purely qualitative point of view. A question that presents itself is whether the31
amount of evidence available for a given proposition α could be quantified. Here32
we give a positive answer to this question.33
The aim of this paper is to propose a probabilistic semantics for a modified34
version of LETJ obtained by dropping the implication symbol → and adding a35
non-classicality operator ● dual to ○. While ○α implies that α behaves classicaly,36
a non-classical behavior of α implies ●α. The logic so obtained is an extension of37
the well-known logic of First-Degree Entailment (FDE), and we call it LETF ,38
the Logic of Evidence and Truth based on FDE. As well as LETJ , LETF is39
suitable to an intuitive reading in terms of evidence and truth.40
In order to capture this idea of preservation of degrees of evidence a non-41
classical notion of probability will be employed. The probabilistic semantics42
proposed here follows the ideas presented in Bueno-Soler and Carnielli (2016,43
2017). Let P (α) =  mean that  is the measure of evidence available for α.44
We call a probabilistic scenario paracomplete when P (α) + P (¬α) < 1, and45
2
paraconsistent when P (α) + P (¬α) > 1. These two cases can be explained,46
respectively, as ‘too little information’ and ‘too much information’ about α.1 In47
both cases, P (○α) < 1, which means that the probability measures of α and ¬α48
are not behaving classically. So, P (○α) < 1 means that the information available49
about α is not reliable, and something must be wrong. If P (○α) = 1, standard50
probability is recovered for α.51
With the purpose of understanding the probabilistic semantics proposed here52
better, we adopt a notion of information space instead of the standard notion53
of sample space. The intuitive idea is to collect all the relevant information54
about a proposition α (or about a set of propositions Γ) and the corresponding55
measures of evidence. So, roughly speaking, an information space is constituted56
by propositions that represent evidence that can be non-conclusive, contradic-57
tory or incomplete, more reliable or less reliable, and sometimes conclusive (we58
return to this point in Section 4.3 below). Such a notion of information space59
requires a generalization of the notion of a partition, and consequently allows60
us to obtain generalized versions of standard results of probability theory such61
as total probability theorem and Bayes’ rule.262
The remainder of this paper is organized in four sections. Section 2 is dedi-63
cated to the logic FDE. It is shown that FDE is suited to an interpretation in64
terms of preservation of evidence. We also present adequate valuation semantics65
and a decision procedure for FDE. In Section 3, FDE is extended to LETF ,66
and an adequate semantics, a decision procedure, and some relevant results are67
presented and discussed. In Section 4, a probabilistic semantics for LETF is68
defined, and paraconsistent and paracomplete versions of total probability the-69
orems and Bayes’ rule are also presented and discussed. Finally, in Section 5, we70
discuss some points related to the topics of this paper that could be developed71
further.72
2 FDE as a logic of preservation of evidence73
The inference rules of BLE were obtained by asking whether an inference rule74
preserves evidence. Since evidence can be incomplete (no evidence at all) and75
contradictory (conflicting evidence), explosion and excluded middle do not hold.76
In BLE, when α (resp. ¬α) holds, the intended meaning is that there is evidence77
for the truth (resp. falsity) of α. Evidence that α is true and evidence that α78
1The connections between the notions of evidence and information will be explained in
Section 2.2.1.
2Our approach differs from the so-called Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory of evidence, de-
veloped by Glenn Shafer in Shafer (1976) and based on earlier work of Arthur Dempster.
DS is focused on degrees of belief and degrees of plausibility. As Lofti Zadeh points out in
his review (Zadeh, 1984), the DS theory falls short as a useful tool for the management of
uncertainty (even for expert systems, for which it was designed). Our approach, as we try
to make clear throughout this paper, uses probabilistic semantics intended to quantify the
evidence attributed to a proposition and introduces a new logic with an intuitive reading in
terms of preservation of evidence and truth. That is the reason we cannot rely on the DS
‘mathematical’ theory of evidence: it is not so attractive as it seems to be at first glance, and
lacks the features we are interested in.
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is false are independent of each other, and are treated as such by the formal79
system. BLE can express the following four scenarios:80
1. Only evidence that α is true: α holds, ¬α does not hold.81
2. Only evidence that α is false: ¬α holds, α does not hold.82
3. No evidence at all: neither α nor ¬α hold.83
4. Conflicting evidence: both α and ¬α hold.384
Evidence for a proposition α is explained in Carnielli and Rodrigues (2017,85
Section 2) as reasons for believing in α, but these reasons may be non-conclusive86
or even wrong, and do not imply the truth of α, nor the belief in α. Thus,87
evidence is a notion weaker than truth in the sense that there may be evidence88
for a proposition α even if α is not true. Below, in Section 2.2.1, starting from89
the notion of information proposed by Dunn (2008), we explain evidence in90
terms of a (perhaps) non-conclusive justification added to a proposition α or, as91
Fitting (2016b) puts it, “justifications that might be wrong”.4 Notice that the92
notion of evidence encompasses non-conclusive as well as conclusive evidence,93
and the latter is evidence that establishes the truth-value of a proposition α.94
The logic of First-Degree Entailment (FDE) is a paraconsistent and para-95
complete propositional logic in a language with conjunction, disjunction, and96
negation, with no theorems nor bottom particles (cf. Anderson and Belnap,97
1963, 1975; Anderson et al., 1992; Belnap, 1977a,b; Dunn, 1976). FDE is a98
fragment of BLE/N4, obtained by dropping the implication symbol and the99
corresponding rules, and it can be interpreted in terms of preservation of evi-100
dence, as well as BLE – the four scenarios above clearly correspond to the four101
truth-values proposed by Belnap (1977a,b) (we return to this point in Section 2.2102
below).5103
Definition 1. The Logic of First-Degree Entailment (FDE)104
Let L1 be a language with a denumerable set of sentential letters {p1, p2, p3, ...},105
the set of connectives {¬,∧,∨}, and parentheses. The set of formulas of L1106
3The expression ‘α holds/does not hold’ here means that α holds/does not hold in BLE.
So, here, it does not mean that α is true/false.
4 Fitting (2016a) presents an embedding of BLE into the modal logic KX4, and an em-
bedding of the later into the justification logic JX4. The latter is equipped with justification
terms that stand for “justification, or evidence, which may be non-factual, uncertain, or con-
tradictory” (Fitting, 2016a, p. 1159). In JX4, ‘t ∶ α’ means that α is justified by reason t.
The notion of evidence expressed by KX4 (implicit evidence) and JX4 (explicit evidence) is
a “formal alternative” of the “informal” notion of evidence expressed by BLE.
5The move from BLE and LETJ to (respectively) FDE and LETF has been motivated by
some difficulties in interpreting the implication of BLE in probabilistic terms. The implication
of BLE is located somewhere in between classical and intuitionistic implication: it is not
classical because Peirce’s Law does not hold, and it is not intuitionistic because the equivalence
between ¬(α → β) and α ∧ ¬β holds. It is not clear what would be the intuitive meaning of
the attribution of a probabilistic measure to a formula α→ β of BLE, and how this measure
would relate to the probabilistic values of α and β. So we decided, at least in this paper, to
work with FDE, the implication-free fragment of BLE.
4
is obtained recursively in the usual way. The logic FDE is defined over the107
language L1 by the following natural deduction rules:108
α β
α ∧ β ∧I α ∧ βα ∧E α ∧ ββ109
110
α
α ∨ β ∨I βα ∨ β α ∨ β
[α]
....
γ
[β]
....
γ
γ ∨E111
112
¬α¬(α ∧ β) ¬ ∧ I ¬β¬(α ∧ β) ¬(α ∧ β)
[¬α]
....
γ
[¬β]
....
γ
γ ¬ ∧E113
114 ¬α ¬β¬(α ∨ β) ¬ ∨ I ¬(α ∨ β)¬α ¬ ∨E ¬(α ∨ β)¬β115
116
α¬¬α DN ¬¬αα117
A deduction of α from a set of premises Γ, Γ ⊢FDE α, is defined as follows:118
there is a derivation with conclusion α and all uncancelled hypotheses in Γ, and119
the definition of a derivation is the usual one for natural deduction systems (see120
e.g. van Dalen (2008, pp. 35-36)).121
Other deductive systems have already been presented for FDE (see Omori and122
Wansing, 2017, Section 2.2), but the natural deduction system proposed here123
makes the symmetry between positive and negative rules explicit: ∧I and ¬∨ I124
are symmetrical, ∨E and ¬ ∧ E are symmetrical, and so on. This mirrors the125
fact that positive and negative evidence are primitive and non-complementary126
notions, but have symmetric deductive behavior: the rule ∧I expresses the idea127
that when there is positive evidence available for both α and β, there is positive128
evidence for α∧β, while the rule ¬∨I means that when there is negative evidence129
available for both α and β, there is negative evidence for α ∨ β.130
Theorem 2.131
Reflexivity, monotonicity, transitivity, and compactness hold for FDE.132
Proof. These well-known properties of FDE can be easily proved by means of133
the natural deduction system above.134
2.1 Valuation semantics for FDE135
We now propose a non-deterministic valuation semantic for FDE.136
Definition 3. Valuation semantics for FDE137
A valuation semantics for FDE is a collection of FDE-valuations defined as fol-138
lows: A function v ∶ L1 → {0,1} is a FDE-valuation if it satisfies the following139
clauses:140
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v1. v(α ∧ β) = 1 iff v(α) = 1 and v(β) = 1,141
v2. v(α ∨ β) = 1 iff v(α) = 1 or v(β) = 1,142
v3. v(¬(α ∧ β)) = 1 iff v(¬α) = 1 or v(¬β) = 1,143
v4. v(¬(α ∨ β)) = 1 iff v(¬α) = 1 and v(¬β) = 1,144
v5. v(α) = 1 iff v(¬¬α) = 1.145
Definition 4. We say that a formula α is a semantical consequence of Γ,146
Γ ⊧FDE α, iff for every valuation v, if v(β) = 1 for all β ∈ Γ, then v(α) = 1.147
This semantics is sound and complete, and provides a decision procedure for148
FDE. From now on, in this section, when there is no risk of ambiguity, we will149
just write ⊢ and ⊧ in the place of ⊢FDE and ⊧FDE .150
Theorem 5. Soundness151
Let Γ be a set of formulas, and α a formula of FDE. So, Γ ⊢ α implies Γ ⊧ α.152
Proof. The proof is routine. It shows that assuming there are sound derivations153
for the premise(s), the derivation obtained by the application of a rule is sound.154
155
Theorem 6. Completeness156
Let Γ be a set of formulas, and α a formula of FDE. Then Γ ⊧ α implies Γ ⊢ α.157
Proof. Completeness can be proved by a Henkin-style proof. Given Γ and α158
such that Γ ⊬ α, a set ∆ maximal w.r.t α can be obtained in the usual way. So,159
the proof of the following propositions is straightforward:160
v1 ′. α ∧ β ∈ ∆ iff α ∈ ∆ and β ∈ ∆;161
v2 ′. α ∨ β ∈ ∆ iff α ∈ ∆ or β ∈ ∆;162
v3 ′. ¬(α ∧ β) ∈ ∆ iff ¬α ∈ ∆ or ¬β ∈ ∆;163
v4 ′. ¬(α ∨ β) ∈ ∆ iff ¬α ∈ ∆ and ¬β ∈ ∆;164
v5 ′. α ∈ ∆ iff ¬¬α ∈ ∆.165
Let v be the mapping from the language L1 to {0,1} defined as follows: for166
every γ ∈ L1, v(γ) = 1 iff γ ∈ ∆. v is a valuation for FDE such that: for every167
β ∈ Γ, v(β) = 1, since Γ ⊆ ∆; but v(α) = 0, since α ∉ ∆ (∆ is maximal w.r.t. α).168
Therefore, Γ ⊭ α.169
170
The valuation semantics proposed in Definition 3 is non-deterministic in the171
sense that the semantic value of a formula ¬α is not a function of the value of172
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α. The possible values a formula can receive are given by quasi-matrices.6 In173
Example 7 below, we illustrate how a quasi-matrix works.174
Example 7. In FDE:175
1. p,¬p ∨ q ⊭ q;176
2. p,¬(p ∧ q) ⊭ ¬q;177
3. ¬p ∧ ¬q â⊧ ¬(p ∨ q);178
4. ¬p ∨ ¬q â⊧ ¬(p ∧ q).179
Proof. Consider the following quasi-matrix:180
181
p 0 1¬p 0 1 0 1
q 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1¬q 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1¬p ∨ q 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1¬(p ∧ q) 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
valuation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
182
The valuations 13 and 14 above show that 1 is invalid, and the valuations 13183
and 15 show that 2 is invalid. The remaining cases (De Morgan laws) are left184
to the reader.185
Remark 8. The first four rows of the quasi-matrix above display the semantic186
values of the propositional variables and the negations of propositional variables187
that occur in the formulas at stake. The 5th and 6th rows are given by clauses188
v2 and v3 of Definition 3. Note that the semantic value of ¬p is not determined189
by the value of p: the value of ¬p bifurcates into 0 and 1 below v(p) = 1 and190
also below v(p) = 0. So, being n the number of propositional variables of a given191
formula, the number of valuations is finite and bounded by 22n. It is intuitively192
clear that the valuation semantics provides a decision procedure for FDE. A193
detailed algorithm, however, will be presented elsewhere.194
2.1.1 Some facts about FDE195
Fact 9. Modus ponens and the deduction theorem do not hold in FDE for an196
implication α → β defined as ¬α ∨ β.197
Proof. That disjunctive syllogism does not hold in FDE is shown by the fol-198
lowing valuation: v(α) = 1, v(¬α) = 1, v(β) = 0. In order to show that the199
deduction theorem does not hold, suppose Γ, α ⊧ β implies Γ ⊧ ¬α∨β. So, from200
α ⊧ α we would get ⊧ ¬α ∨ α, but the latter is invalid in FDE.201
6A quasi-matrix is a non-deterministic matrix that represents non-deterministic valuation
semantics. The notion of quasi-matrix was introduced by da Costa and Alves in da Costa and
Alves (1977), where a valuation semantics was proposed for da Costa’s logic C1 (in da Costa
and Alves (1977, p. 624, Def. 11) a detailed explanation of how to construct a quasi-matrix
for C1 can be found). See also Loparic (1986, 2010); Loparic and Alves (1979), where decision
procedures based on quasi-matrices are provided for da Costa’s Cω and for intuitionistic logic.
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Fact 10. Grounding of contradictoriness202
A compound formula α is contradictory in a valuation v, i.e. v(α) = 1 and203
v(¬α) = 1, only if at least one propositional letter p that occurs in α is contra-204
dictory in v.205
Proof. Suppose there is a valuation v such that v(α) = v(¬α) = 1. We prove206
that there is at least one propositional letter p in α such that v(p) = v(¬p) = 1.207
If α = p, clearly, v(α) = v(¬α) = v(p) = v(¬p) = 1. The remaining cases are208
proved by induction on the complexity of α.209
Case 1. α = ¬¬β. I.H.: if v(β) = v(¬β) = 1, there is a p in β such that210
v(p) = v(¬p) = 1. Suppose v(¬¬β) = v(¬¬¬β) = 1. So, by Definition 3, v(β) =211
v(¬β) = 1. The result follows by the inductive hypothesis.212
Case 2. α = β ∧ γ. I.H.: if v(β) = v(¬β) = 1, there is a p in β such that213
v(p) = v(¬p) = 1; mutatis mutandis for γ. Suppose v(β ∧ γ) = v(¬(β ∧ γ)) = 1.214
So, by Definition 3, v(β) = v(γ) = 1, and either v(¬β) = 1 or v(¬γ) = 1. By the215
inductive hypothesis, there is a p either in β or in γ such that v(p) = v(¬p) = 1.216
The remaining cases are left to the reader.217
Fact 11. Grounding of incompleteness218
A compound formula α is incomplete in a valuation v, i.e. v(α) = 0 and219
v(¬α) = 0, only if at least one propositional letter p that occurs in α is incom-220
plete in v.221
Proof. Similar to the proof of Fact 10 above.222
It is to be noted that the converse of Facts 10 and 11 do not hold: there may223
be a contradictory (resp. incomplete) atom p in a formula α without α being224
contradictory (resp. incomplete). Let α be the formula p ∨ q and consider the225
valuation v such that v(p) = v(¬p) = 1, v(q) = 1 and v(¬q) = 0. In this case,226
p is a contradictory propositional letter, but p ∨ q is not contradictory. On the227
other hand, in the valuation v(p) = v(¬p) = 0, v(q) = 1 and v(¬q) = 0, p is a228
incomplete propositional letter, but p ∨ q is not incomplete. Both valuations229
make v(p ∨ q) = 1 and v(¬(p ∨ q)) = 0.230
2.2 Equivalence with Belnap’s four-valued and Dunn’s re-231
lational semantics232
The valuation semantics proposed above, as expected, is equivalent both to the233
two-valued relational semantics proposed by Dunn (1976) and to the four-valued234
semantics presented by Belnap (1977b).7235
Definition 12. Dunn’s relational semantics for FDE236
A Dunn-interpretation for FDE is a relation ρ between the set of formulas of237
FDE and the values T and F, ρ ⊆ L × {T,F}, satisfying the following clauses:238
7The literature has a variety of algorithmic procedures that provide translations between
finite-valued semantics and valuation semantics. One of them is given in Caleiro, Carnielli,
Coniglio, and Marcos (2005). For the ease of the reader, however, we give below a direct proof
of the equivalence between FDE -valuations, Dunn’s and Belnap’s semantics for FDE.
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1. ¬αρT iff αρF ,239
2. ¬αρF iff αρT ,240
3. (α ∧ β)ρT iff αρT and βρT ,241
4. (α ∨ β)ρT iff αρT or βρT ,242
5. (α ∧ β)ρF iff αρF or βρF ,243
6. (α ∨ β)ρF iff αρF and βρF .244
Definition 13. A formula α is a Dunn semantic consequence of Γ, Γ ⊧D α, iff245
for all Dunn-interpretations ρ, if βρT for all β ∈ Γ, then αρT .246
Definition 14. Belnap’s four-valued semantics for FDE247
A four-valued interpretation for FDE is a function vB from the set of formulas248
of FDE to the semantic values {T,F,B,N} satisfying the following matrices:249
α ¬α
T F
F T
B B
N N
α ∧ β T F B N
T T F B N
F F F F F
B B F B F
N N F F N
α ∨ β T F B N
T T T T T
F T F B N
B T B B T
N T N T N
250
251
Definition 15. Let D = {T,B} be the set of designated values of Belnap’s252
four-valued semantics. A formula α is a four-valued semantic consequence of253
Γ, Γ ⊧B α, iff for all four-valued interpretations vB, if vB(β) ∈D for all β ∈ Γ,254
then vB(α) ∈D.255
The valuation semantics of Definition 3, Dunn’s relational semantics of Def-256
inition 12, and Belnap’s four-valued semantics of Definition 14 intend to repre-257
sent four scenarios. Belnap (1977b, p. 11) explains the semantic values T, F,258
N, and B with the notion of a computer ‘being told’, so, these values mean,259
respectively, ‘just told true’, ‘just told false’, ‘told neither true nor false’, and260
‘told both true and false’ (we return to this point in Section 2.2.1 below). Dunn261
(1976, p. 156) explains them in terms of subsets of {T,F}, so a proposition can262
be related to {T}, {F}, ∅, and {T,F}. In Section 2 above we explained these263
four scenarios in terms of availability of evidence.264
Although both the valuation semantics proposed here and Dunn’s relational265
semantics are bi-valued, and end up being equivalent, they have an essential266
difference: a valuation is a function from the set of formulas to {0,1}, while a267
Dunn interpretation is a relation between the set of formulas and {T,F}. In the268
latter, a formula can be related simultaneously to both T and F, when it is, in269
the Dunn-Belnap reading, both true and false, or not related to T nor F, when270
it is neither true nor false. But these three semantics, as expected, validate the271
same inferences, i.e. Γ ⊧FDE α iff Γ ⊧D α iff Γ ⊧B α.272
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Definition 16. (Dunn interpretation induced by an FDE-valuation)273
Given a FDE-valuation v, we define a Dunn-interpretation ρv, based on v, as274
follows:275
αρvT iff v(α) = 1276
α¬ρvT iff v(α) = 0277
αρvF iff v(¬α) = 1278
α¬ρvF iff v(¬α) = 0279
Definition 17. (FDE-valuation induced by a Dunn-interpretation)280
Given a Dunn-interpretation ρ, we define a FDE-valuation vρ, based on ρ, as281
follows:282
vρ(α) = 1 iff αρT283
vρ(α) = 0 iff α¬ρT284
vρ(¬α) = 1 iff αρF285
vρ(¬α) = 0 iff α¬ρF286
Lemma 18. Given an FDE-valuation v, then ρv is a Dunn-interpretation.287
Proof. We have to prove that ρv is a Dunn’s relational semantics as in Defini-288
tion 12.289
1. ¬αρvT iff v(¬α) = 1 iff αρvF290
2. ¬αρvF iff v(¬¬α) = 1 iff v(α) = 1 iff αρvT291
3. (α ∧ β)ρvT iff v(α ∧ β) = 1 iff v(α) = 1 and v(β) = 1 iff αρvT and βρvT292
4. (α ∨ β)ρvT iff v(α ∨ β) = 1 iff v(α) = 1 or v(β) = 1 iff αρvT or βρvT293
5. (α ∧ β)ρvF iff v(¬(α ∧ β)) = 1 iff v(¬α) = 1 or v(¬β) = 1 iff αρvF or βρvF294
6. (α ∨ β)ρvF iff v(¬(α ∨ β)) = 1 iff v(¬α) = 1 and v(¬β) = 1 iff αρvF and295
βρvF296
297
Lemma 19. Given a Dunn-intepretation ρ, then vρ is a FDE-valuation.298
Proof. We have to prove that vρ is a FDE-valuation as in Definition 3.299
1. vρ(α ∧ β) = 1 iff (α ∧ β)ρT iff αρT and βρT iff vρ(α) = 1 and vρ(β) = 1300
2. vρ(α ∨ β) = 1 iff (α ∨ β)ρT iff αρT or βρT iff vρ(α) = 1 or vρ(β) = 1301
3. vρ(¬(α ∧ β)) = 1 iff (α ∧ β)ρF iff αρF or βρF iff vρ(¬α) = 1 or vρ(¬β) = 1302
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4. vρ(¬(α∨β)) = 1 iff (α∨β)ρF iff αρF and βρF iff vρ(¬α) = 1 and vρ(¬β) = 1303
5. vρ(α) = 1 iff (α)ρT iff ¬αρF iff ¬¬αρT iff vρ(¬¬α) = 1304
305
Lemma 20.306
The valuation semantics (Definition 3) and Dunn-interpretation (Definition 12)307
are equivalent, that is, given a valuation semantics v there exists a Dunn-308
interpretation ρv such that309
vρ(α) = 1 iff αρT310
vρ(α) = 0 iff α¬ρT311
vρ(¬α) = 1 iff αρF312
vρ(¬α) = 0 iff α¬ρF313
for any proposition α; and vice-versa, given a Dunn-interpretation ρ, there exists314
a valuation vρ such that:315
αρvT iff v(α) = 1316
α¬ρvT iff v(α) = 0317
αρvF iff v(¬α) = 1318
α¬ρvF iff v(¬α) = 0319
for any proposition α.320
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 18 and Lemma 19 above.321
Lemma 21. The valuation semantics (Definition 3) and Belnap’s four-valued322
semantics for FDE (Definition 14) are equivalent.323
Proof. It follows from Lemma 20 and the well-known fact that Dunn’s and324
Belnap’s semantics are equivalent.325
Theorem 22. The valuation semantics, the Dunn interpretation and the Bel-326
nap interpretation define equivalent notions of logical consequence: Γ ⊧FDE α327
iff Γ ⊧B α iff Γ ⊧D α.328
Proof. It follows from Lemma 20 and Lemma 21.329
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2.2.1 On paraconsistency, evidence, and information330
FDE is the well-known and widely studied ‘useful four-valued logic’ proposed by331
Belnap and Dunn as the underlying logic of an artificial information processor,332
i.e. a computer, capable of dealing with information received from different333
sources that are not entirely reliable (cf. Belnap, 1977a,b; Dunn, 1976). The334
semantic value Both is intended to represent the circumstance in which there is335
conflicting information about α, i.e. both α and ¬α hold, and None is intended336
to represent the circumstance in which there is no information at all about α,337
i.e. neither α nor ¬α holds.338
When Belnap explains these four values, he talks about a computer ‘being339
told’ that a proposition α is true, or false. The computer should be able to com-340
pute the values of complex propositions and draw inferences from the received341
information, but it “can only accept and report information without divesting342
itself of it” (Belnap, 1977b, p. 9). Of course, contradictory information stored343
in a database should not be taken as true, as Belnap (1977a, p. 47) remarks344
that345
these sentences have truth-values independently of what the com-346
puter has been told; but who can gainsay that the computer cannot347
use the actual truth-value of the sentences in which it is interested?348
All it can possibly use as a basis for inference is what it knows or349
believes, i.e., what it has been told.350
The computer, when asked, must provide information based only on what it351
has been told, otherwise “we would have no way of knowing that its data-base352
harbored contradictory information” (Belnap, 1977b, p. 9).8353
This notion of ‘a computer being told’ is clearly weaker than truth, since a354
computer may be told that α is true even if it is not the case. So, Belnap is not355
really talking about truth simpliciter. On the other hand, Dunn (1976, p. 157)356
seems not to be totally comfortable with the interpretation of FDE in terms of357
the simultaneous truth of α and ¬α:358
Do not get me wrong – I am not claiming that there are sentences359
which are in fact both true and false. I am merely pointing out360
that there are plenty of situations where we suppose, assert, believe,361
etc., contradictory sentences to be true, and we therefore need a362
semantics which expresses the truth conditions of contradictions in363
terms of the truth values that the ingredient sentences would have364
to take for the contradictions to be true.365
Indeed, we should consider Dunn’s relational semantics as a fac¸on de parler,366
rather than a claim that true contradictions are possible. Obviously, the si-367
multaneous attribution of the semantic value True to a pair of propositions α368
8Belnap’s approach to the problem is akin to the idea, defended by us in a number of
places, that a contradiction α and ¬α can be ‘more informative’ than a single assertion of α,
or of ¬α, when neither α nor ¬α has been conclusively established. Indeed, in such cases, the
contradiction makes it explicit that something is wrong and must be further investigated.
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and ¬α is not to be understood as an acceptance of dialetheism. It is worth369
noting that at the time Belnap’s and Dunn’s papers were published, although370
there were already several paraconsistent formal systems available, the concep-371
tual discussion about the nature of contradictions accepted by paraconsistent372
logics was still in its beginnings. It was a ‘lateral issue’ that had not yet been373
brought to the center of debate.374
That the four values represented by Belnap-Dunn’s semantics correspond to375
the four scenarios of availability of evidence the logic BLE expresses has been376
shown in Section 2.2 above. The notions of evidence and information, indeed,377
are akin to each other, and both are well-suited to a non-dialetheist reading of378
paraconsistency. Let us take a closer look at these two notions.379
In Carnielli and Rodrigues (2017, Section 2) the notion of evidence for a380
proposition α was explained as ‘reasons for believing and/or accepting α’. Ev-381
idence, when conclusive, gives support to the truth (or falsity) of α, and thus382
it has to do with the justification of α (or ¬α). The idea behind the recovery383
operator ○, introduced in Section 3 below, is that if there is conclusive evidence384
for the truth, or falsity, of a proposition α, then α is subjected to classical logic.385
But evidence can be non-conclusive, and so there may be conflicting evidence386
for a proposition α. Besides being weaker than truth, evidence does not imply387
belief: there may be evidence for α, an agent may be aware of such evidence but388
still does not believe in α. If there is non-conclusive evidence for α, it means389
that there is some degree of justification for α that, however, is not conclusive390
and might be wrong.9391
Dunn (2008, p. 589) explains a ‘bare-boned’ notion of information as:392
what is left from knowledge when you subtract, justification, truth,393
belief, and any other ingredients such as reliability that relate to394
justification. Information is, as it were, a mere “idle thought.” Oh,395
one other thing, I want to subtract the thinker. (...) Anyone who396
has searched for information on the Web does not have to have this397
concept drummed home. So much of what we find on the Web has398
no truth or justification, and one would have to be a fool to believe399
it (...) [Information] is something like a Fregean “thought,” i.e., the400
“content” of a belief that is equally shared by a doubt, a concern, a401
wish, etc.402
Information, so understood, is what is expresses by a proposition, indeed similar403
to a Fregean thought but without its platonic ingredient. It is objective, does not404
imply belief, does not need to be true. The difference between this bare-boned405
notion of information and the notion of non-conclusive evidence is that the latter406
has an epistemic ingredient that is lacking by the former. So, we can characterize407
non-conclusive evidence as bare-boned information plus a justification that might408
be wrong. Indeed, situations in which we have something that may be or may be409
not a justification for some proposition α are quite common, and there is nothing410
9This notion of evidence is in line with the discussion carried out in Achinstein (2010a,b);
Kelly (2014).
13
wrong in saying that evidence, conclusive or non-conclusive, is still information:411
a proposition α is information, as well as the claim that α has been established412
as true. The notion of information is thus more general than evidence. It is not413
surprising, therefore, that both BLE and FDE are suitable to a non-dialetheist414
interpretation in terms of evidence and information.415
3 Extending FDE to a logic of evidence and truth416
FDE will now be extended to the logic LETF , in a similar way to what was417
done with BLE obtaining LETJ in Carnielli and Rodrigues (2017). Both LETJ418
and LETF are Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Undeterminedness (LFIU s)419
(cf. Carnielli and Rodrigues, 2017; Carnielli, Coniglio, and Rodrigues, 2019;420
Marcos, 2005). In LFI s,421
α,¬α ⊬ β, while ○α,α,¬α ⊢ β,422
and in LFU s,423 ⊬ α ∨ ¬α, while ○α ⊢ α ∨ ¬α.10424
When ○α holds, and so excluded middle and explosion are valid, we say that α425
is classical. For this reason, in LFIU s, like the logics LETJ and LETF , we say426
that ○ is a classicality operator.427
Like BLE, the logic FDE, interpreted from the viewpoint of preservation428
of evidence, is not able to express preservation of truth. Indeed, none of the429
semantics presented for FDE in Section 2.1 can distinguish a context (i) where430
there there is non-conclusive evidence for α, so α has not been established as431
true, but no evidence for ¬α. from another context (ii) where there is conclusive432
evidence for α and so α has been established as true, and ¬α does not hold.433
In both (i) and (ii), α and ¬α receive respectively the values 1 and 0 by the434
valuation semantics (Definition 3), or the values T and F by the Belnap’s four435
valued semantics (Definition 14), and so we cannot distinguish between (i) and436
(ii). The logic LETF , on the other hand, is able to distinguish these contexts.437
Definition 23. The Logic of Evidence and Truth based on FDE (LETF )438
Let L2 be a language with a denumerable set of sentential letters {p1, p2, p3, ...},439
the set of connectives {○, ●,¬,∧,∨,} and parentheses. The set of formulas of L2440
is obtained recursively in the usual way. The logic LETF is defined over the441
language L2 by adding the following rules to the natural deduction system of442
FDE (Definition 1):443
10Definitions of Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Undeterminedness can be found in
Carnielli, Coniglio, and Rodrigues (2019) (Defs. 9 and 11). Note that the notion of incom-
pleteness in the interpretation of FDE in terms of evidence/information (e.g. Fact 11) is
analogous to the notion of undeterminedness in LFU s. Actually, in our view, except for the
same acronym of LFI s, LFU s could well be called Logics of Formal Incompleteness. The
name LFU was established in Marcos (2005) and adopted in Carnielli and Rodrigues (2017)
and Carnielli, Coniglio, and Rodrigues (2019).
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○α ●α
β
Cons ○α ∨ ●α Comp444
445 ○α α ¬α
β
EXP ○ ○α
α ∨ ¬α PEM○446
A deduction of α from a set of premises Γ in LETF , Γ ⊢LETF α, is defined as447
follows: there is a derivation with conclusion α and all uncancelled hypotheses in448
Γ. The definition of a derivation is the usual one for natural deduction systems449
(see e.g. van Dalen (2008, pp. 35-36)).450
Theorem 24. The following properties hold for LETF :451
1. Reflexivity: if α ∈ Γ, then Γ ⊢LETF α;452
2. Monotonicity: if Γ ⊢LETF β, then Γ, α ⊢LETF β, for any α;453
3. Transitivity (cut): if ∆ ⊢LETF α and Γ, α ⊢LETF β, then ∆,Γ ⊢LETF β;454
4. Compactness: if Γ ⊢LETF α, then there is ∆ ⊆ Γ, ∆ finite such that455
∆ ⊢LETF α.456
Proof. Straightforward, from the definition of a deduction of α from premises457
in Γ in LETF .458
Fact 25. The following rules hold in LETF :
α ¬α●α ●R1 α ∨ ¬α ∨ ●α ●R2
Proof. We prove ●R1. The proof of ●R2 is left to the reader.
○α ∨ ●α Comp [○α]1 α ¬α●α EXP ○ [●α]1●α 1,∨E
459
3.1 On the connectives ○ and ●460
The rules PEM○ and EXP ○ recover classical logic for propositions in the scope461
of ○ (this claim will be made precise by Fact 31 below). As well as LETJ , LETF462
is suitable to an intuitive reading in terms of different contexts concerned with463
preservation of evidence and preservation of truth. But unlike LETJ , LETF has464
a non-classicality operator ●, dual to the classicality operator ○. This duality is465
made clear by the rules above (Fact 25): R1 is the dual of EXP ○, and R2 is the466
dual of PEM○11. While ○α implies a classical behavior for α, a non-classical467
11Actually, different versions of LETF can be obtained by adding to FDE, besides Cons
and Comp, the following pair of rules: PEM○ and EXP ○; ●R1 and ●R2; PEM○ and ●R1;
EXP ○ and ●R2. Notice that the rules EXP ○ and ●R2 are dual, as well as PEM○ and ●R1
(cf. Carnielli et al., 2019).
15
behavior of α implies ●α. Notice that: (i) ○α does not imply α, rather, it implies468
that one and at most one between α and ¬α holds; (ii) ●α does not imply that α469
and ¬α hold; indeed, according to R2, if both α and ¬α do not hold, ●α holds.470
Strictly speaking, ○α recovers classical logic for α. The intended interpreta-471
tion of ○α is that there is conclusive evidence for α or ¬α, and so the truth-value472
of α is conclusively established as true or false. On the other hand, if evidence473
for α is non-conclusive, or it is contradictory, or there is no evidence at all, then474 ●α holds. The rule Cons prohibits the circumstance such that there is and there475
is not conclusive evidence for α, while Comp expresses the fact that either there476
is or there is not conclusive evidence for α.477
478
Since LETF distinguishes conclusive from non-conclusive evidence, it is able479
to express the following six scenarios:12480
When ●α holds, four scenarios of non-conclusive evidence can be expressed:481
1. Only evidence that α is true: α holds, ¬α does not hold.482
2. Only evidence that α is false: ¬α holds, α does not hold.483
3. No evidence at all: both α and ¬α do not hold.484
4. Conflicting evidence: both α and ¬α hold.485
When ○α holds, two scenarios can be expressed, tantamount to classical486
truth and falsity:487
5. Conclusive evidence for α: α is true (○α ∧ α holds).488
6. Conclusive evidence for ¬α: ¬α is true (○α ∧ ¬α holds).489
Of course, a scenario with conclusive evidence for both α and ¬α is not allowed,490
since it would imply that α is true and false simultaneously. Indeed, if classical491
logic holds for α, it cannot be that there is any residual conflicting evidence for492
α and ¬α.493
3.2 Valuation semantics for LETF494
Definition 26. A valuation semantics for LETF is obtained by adding the495
following clauses to the valuation semantics of FDE (Definition 3):496
v6. v(●α) = 1 iff v(○α) = 0,497
v7. If v(○α) = 1, then v(α) = 1 if and only if v(¬α) = 0.498
12 In classical logic, ‘α holds’ means that α is true, while in FDE, according to the intended
interpretation in terms of evidence, ‘α holds’ means that there is evidence available for α. In
LETF , the meaning of ‘α holds’ depends on the context: if the context is classical, it means
that α is true. This is precisely the point of the classicality operator ○. So, two additional
scenarios can be expressed, besides the four scenarios of FDE.
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Definition 27. We say that a formula α is a semantical consequence of Γ,499
Γ ⊧LETF α iff for every valuation v, if v(β) = 1 for all β ∈ Γ, then v(α) = 1.500
The valuation semantics given above in Definition 26 is sound, complete, and501
provides a decision procedure for LETF . From now on, when there is no risk of502
ambiguity, we will just write ⊢ and ⊧ in the place of ⊢LETF and ⊧LETF .503
Theorem 28. Soundness and completeness of LETF w.r.t. the valuation se-504
mantics: Γ ⊧ α iff Γ ⊢ α.505
Proof. In order to prove completeness, the proof of Theorem 6 has to be ex-506
tended to include clauses 6′ and 7′ below:507
v6 ′. ○α ∈ ∆ iff ●α ∉ ∆,508
v7 ′. ○α ∈ ∆ implies ¬α ∈ ∆ iff α ∉ ∆.509
For soundness, it can be shown that rules Cons, Comp, EXP ○, and PEM○ are510
sound with respect to clauses 6 and 7 of Definition 26 above. Details are left to511
the reader.512
513
The quasi-matrix below displays the behavior of the connectives ○ and ● in514
LETF .515
p 0 1¬p 0 1 0 1○p 0 1 0 1 0 0●p 1 0 1 0 1 1
valuation 1 2 3 4 5 6
516
The first two lines display the possible values of p and ¬p. The connectives ○517
and ● are primitive and unary, but the semantic values of ○p and ●p depend518
(non-deterministically) on the semantic values of p and ¬p. When v(p) = 1 and519
v(¬p) = 0, v(p) = 0 and v(¬p) = 1, the value of ○p and ●p bifurcates into 0 and520
1. This expresses the fact that ○p is undetermined in LETF when v(p) ≠ v(¬p),521
as explained in page 14 above. In terms of evidence, valuations v1 and v6 show,522
respectively, that no evidence at all, as well as conflicting evidence, implies523
v(●p) = 1 and v(○p) = 0. But if only one holds among p and ¬p (valuations v2 to524
v5), then v(●p) and v(○p) are left undetermined. The rationale of this is that in525
order to say that p is true, or false, only the information that there is evidence526
for the truth, or for the falsity, of p is not enough. Something else is needed,527
namely, the information that such evidence is conclusive.13528
In Example 29 below we illustrate how quasi-matrices work in LETF .529
13Note that valuations express evidence available from a purely qualitative point of view.
An analogy with analytical chemistry at this point may be illuminating. Qualitative analysis
is concerned with whether or not some sample contains a given substance, while quantitative
analysis asks how much of a substance is contained in a sample. Analogously, the valuation
semantics represents only that there is or there is not positive and negative evidence available
for α, while the probabilistic semantics, presented in Section 4 below, intends to express the
amount of such evidence.
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Example 29. In LETF :530
1. p ∨ ¬p ⊭ ○p531
2. ●p ⊭ p ∧ ¬p532
3. ○p, p,¬p ∨ q ⊧ q;533
4. ○p, p,¬(p ∧ q) ⊧ ¬q;534
Proof. Consider the following quasi-matrix (divided into two parts):535
p 0¬p 0 1
q 0 1 0 1¬q 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1¬p ∨ q 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1¬(p ∧ q) 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1○p 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1●p 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
valuation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
536
p 1¬p 0 1
q 0 1 0 1¬q 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1¬p ∨ q 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1¬(p ∧ q) 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1○p 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0●p 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
valuation 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
537
Item 1: since v24(p) = v24(¬p) = 1, v24(p ∨ ¬p) = 1, but v24(○p) = 0. Item 2:538
v1(●p) = 1, but v1(p ∧ ¬p) = 0, since v1(p) = v1(¬p) = 0. For items 3 and 4, it539
is easy to check that there is no valuation v such that the premises receive the540
value 1 but the conclusion receives 0 in v (compare with items 1 and 2 of Fact541
7).542
Remark 30. The 7th row of the quasi-matrix above is given by clause v7 and543
the 8th by clause v6 of Definition 26. A quasi-matrix for LETF is finite, and544
similarly to FDE (see Remark 8), it is intuitively clear that the valuation se-545
mantics provides a decision procedure for LETF . A detailed algorithm will be546
presented elsewhere.547
3.3 Some facts about LETF548
Fact 31 below shows how the operator ○ recovers classical logic in LETF .549
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Fact 31. Recovering classical logic in LETF550
Suppose ○¬n1α1, ○¬n2α2, . . . , ○¬nmαm hold, for ni ≥ 0 (where, ¬ni , ni ≥ 0, rep-551
resents ni iterations of negations of the formula αi). Then, for any formula β552
formed with α1, α2, . . . , αm over {∧,∨,¬}, β behaves classically.553
Proof.554
First, we show that for any value of ni ≥ 0, ○¬niαi ⊢ αi ∨ ¬αi and ○¬niαi, αi ∧555 ¬αi ⊢ γ, for any γ – i.e. excluded middle and explosion hold for αi.556
Suppose ○¬niαi holds. So, ¬niαi ∨ ¬¬niαi and ¬niαi ∧ ¬¬niαi ⊢ γ hold. If ni557
is even, ¬niαi ⊣⊢ αi, and if ni is odd, ¬niαi ⊣⊢ ¬αi. So, it is easily proved558
that ¬niαi ∨¬¬niαi ⊢ αi ∨¬αi. Since we have that ○¬niαi ⊢ ¬niαi ∨¬¬niαi, by559
transitivity, we get ○¬niαi ⊢ αi ∨ ¬αi. In order to recover explosion, it can be560
easily proved that αi∧¬αi ⊢ ¬niαi∧¬¬niαi. Since we have that ○¬niαi,¬niαi∧561 ¬¬niαi ⊢ γ, by transitivity, we get ○¬niαi, αi ∧ ¬αi ⊢ γ.562
Remember that full classical logic can be obtained by adding explosion and563
excluded middle to the introduction and elimination rules of ∧ and ∨, α1 → α2564
being defined as ¬α1 ∨ α2. Now, in order to prove the result, it is enough565
to show that for any formula β formed with α1, α2, . . . , αm over {∧,∨,¬}, if566 ○¬n1α1, ○¬n2α2, . . . , ○¬nmαm hold, then ⊢ β ∨ ¬β and β,¬β ⊢ γ hold.567
Let Γ = {○¬n1α1, ○¬n2α2, . . . , ○¬nmαm}.568
If β = αi, it has been proved above. The remaining cases are proved by induction569
on the complexity of β.570
Case 1. β = ¬δ. I.H. Γ, δ,¬δ ⊢ γ and Γ ⊢ δ ∨ ¬δ. It can be easily proved that571
Γ,¬δ,¬¬δ ⊢ γ and Γ ⊢ ¬δ ∨ ¬¬δ.572
Case 2. β = δ1 ∧ δ2. I.H. Γ, δ1,¬δ1 ⊢ γ and Γ ⊢ δ1 ∨ ¬δ1, mutatis mutandis for573
δ2. It can be proved that Γ, δ1 ∧ δ2,¬(δ1 ∧ δ2) ⊢ γ and Γ ⊢ (δ1 ∧ δ2) ∨ ¬(δ1 ∧ δ2)574
The remaining cases are left to the reader.575
We have seen in Fact 9 that for an implication α → β defined in FDE576
as ¬α ∨ β, modus ponens and the deduction theorem do not hold. Both are577
recovered for the defined implication in LETF for classical propositions.578
Fact 32.579
1. In LETF , for classical propositions, modus ponens holds: ○α,α,¬α ∨ β ⊢ β.580
Proof.
¬α ∨ β ○α α [¬α]1β EXP ○ [β]1
β
1,∨E
581
2. In LETF , the following form of the deduction theorem holds: ○α,α ⊢ β582
implies ○α ⊢ ¬α ∨ β.583
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Proof.
○α
α ∨ ¬α PEM○
○α, [α]1
....
β¬α ∨ β ∨I [¬α]1¬α ∨ β ∨I¬α ∨ β 1,∨E
584
Definition 33. Supplementing and complementing negations (Carnielli et al.,585
2007, pp. 12ff)586
1. We say that a unary connective ∗ in a logic L is a supplementing nega-587
tion if: (i) for some formula α, ∗α is not a bottom particle, and (ii) for588
any Γ, α and β: Γ, α,∗α ⊢L β.589
2. We say that a unary connective ∗ in a logic L is a complementing nega-590
tion if: (i) for some formula α, ∗α is not a top particle;591
(ii) for any Γ, α and β: Γ, α ⊢L β and Γ,∗α ⊢L β implies Γ ⊢L β.592
If ∗ is a complementing negation, for any α, at least one between α and ∗α hold,593
and if ∗ is a complementing negation, it cannot be that both α and ∗α hold.594
Each one expresses one half of classical negation, the former excluded middle,595
the latter explosion. If a logic L has a (primitive or defined) negation connective596
that is both supplementing and complementing, then L has a classical negation.597
A complementing negation and a supplementing negation can be defined in598
LETF .599
Definition 34. The following unary connectives can be defined in LETF :600
1. The connective truth: ⊕α def= ○α ∧ α;601
2. The connective falsity: ∼α def= ○α ∧ ¬α;602
3. The connective falsity-excluding: ⊖α def= ●α ∨ α;603
4. The connective truth-excluding: ≈α def= ●α ∨ ¬α.604
The tables are the following:605
α 0 1¬α 0 1 0 1○α 0 0 1 0 1 0●α 1 1 0 1 0 1⊕α 0 0 0 0 1 0∼α 0 0 1 0 0 0⊖α 1 1 0 1 1 1≈ α 1 1 1 1 0 1
606
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These connectives have been named for the following reasons. According to the607
proposed interpretation: (1) ○α ∧ α means that there is conclusive evidence for608
α, and so α is true (⊕α); (2) ○α ∧ ¬α means that there is conclusive evidence609
for the falsity of α, and so α is false (∼α); (3) ●α ∨ α means that there is no610
conclusive evidence for α, or α holds, and so it excludes the falsity of α (⊖α); (4)611 ●α∨¬α means that there is no conclusive evidence for α, or ¬α holds, and so it612
excludes the truth of α (≈α). It is also clear from the table above and Definition613
33 that ∼α is a supplementing negation (if v(α) = 1, v(∼α) = 0, they cannot614
be both 1), while ≈α is a complementing negation (if v(α) = 0, v(≈α) = 1, they615
cannot be both 0).14 We conjecture that no classical negation can be defined in616
LETF .
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These four connectives enjoy some interesting logical relations w.r.t. each618
other that can be displayed by a square of oppositions:619
⊕α ∼α
⊖α ≈α
Contradictory
Contrary
Subcontrary
D
u
al
D
u
al
620
∼α and ⊕α are contrary propositions (i.e., they can both be false, but they621
cannot both be simultaneously true); ≈α and ⊖α are subcontrary propositions622
(i.e., they can both be true, but they cannot both be simultaneously false); ⊕α623
(resp. ∼α) is the dual of ⊖α (resp. ≈α); ⊕α (resp. ∼α) is the contradictory624
of ≈α (resp. ⊖). Notice that in LETF , ○ is the dual of ●, and ¬ is the dual625
of itself (on duality between non-deterministic connectives in Logics of Formal626
Inconsistency and Undeterminedness, see Carnielli et al. (2019)).627
Fact 35.628
1. ○α∧α∧¬α, ○α∧ ●α, ⊕α∧ ∼α, ⊕α∧ ≈α, and ⊖α∧ ∼α are bottom particles629
in LETF .630
14Although ∼ is explosive, it is not a classical negation, since α ∨ ∼α does not hold, which
is shown by the valuation v(α) = v(¬α) = v(○α) = 0, and although α ∨ ≈α holds, ≈ is also
not a classical negation, since α,≈α ⊢ β does not hold, which is shown by the valuation
v(α) = v(¬α) = v(●α) = 1.
15One possibility for proving that classical negation is not definable in LETF is to adapt the
methods of Lahav, Marcos, and Zohar (2016), although they are devoted to non-classical nega-
tions from a modal viewpoint. We have been unable however, to find a convincing argument
in this direction.
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2. ∼ is a supplementing negation in LETF .631
3. ≈ is a complementing negation in LETF .632
Proof. In a few steps from the rules Cons, EXP ○ and ●R2.633
Theorem 36. The following propositions are theorems of LETF :634
1. ○α ∨ ●α635
2. α ∨ ¬α ∨ ●α636
3. (●α ∧ α) ∨ (●α ∧ ¬α) ∨ ●α ∨ (●α ∧ α ∧ ¬α) ∨ (○α ∧ α) ∨ (○α ∧ ¬α)637
4. α ∨ ¬α ∨ ⊖α638
5. α ∨ ¬α ∨ ≈α639
6. ⊕α ∨ ∼α ∨ ●α640
Proof. Items 1 and 2 follow from the rules Comp and R2. To prove 3, from641 ○α ⊢ α ∨ ¬α, we obtain ○α ⊢ (○α ∧ α) ∨ (○α ∧ ¬α), and so ○α ⊢ (●α ∧ α) ∨642 (●α ∧ ¬α) ∨ ●α ∨ (●α ∧ α ∧ ¬α) ∨ (○α ∧ α) ∨ (○α ∧ ¬α). On the other hand,643 ●α ⊢ (●α∧α)∨ (●α∧¬α)∨●α∨ (●α∧α∧¬α)∨ (○α∧α)∨ (○α∧¬α) holds. Now,644
use 1 and ∨E. The proofs of 4, 5, and 6 are left to the reader. Notice that item645
3 corresponds to the six scenarios presented in Section 3.1.646
4 Probabilistic semantics for LETF647
We now present a probabilistic semantics for LETF and FDE.648
Definition 37. Given a logic L, with a derivability relation ⊢ and a language649
L, a probability distribution for L is a real-valued function P ∶ L→ R satisfying650
the following conditions:651
1. Non-negativity: 0 ≤ P (α) ≤ 1 for all α ∈ L;652
2. Tautologicity: If ⊢ α, then P (α) = 1;653
3. Anti-Tautologicity: If α = , then P (α) = 0;654
4. Comparison: If α ⊢ β, then P (α) ≤ P (β);655
5. Finite additivity: P (α ∨ β) = P (α) + P (β) − P (α ∧ β).656
The clauses above can be regarded as meta-axioms that define probability func-657
tions for an appropriate logic L just by taking ⊢ as the derivability relation of658 L, and so the notion of probability can be regarded as logic-dependent. These659
clauses define probability functions for both FDE and LETF just by employing660
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respectively ⊢FDE and ⊢LETF .16 From now on, we will concentrate on LETF ,661
but it should be clear that the meta-axioms 1, 4 and 5 above define probability662
distributions for FDE as well.663
Definition 38. LETF -probability distribution664
Let Σ = {α1,⋯, αn,⋯} be a (finite or infinite) collection of propositions in the665
language L2 of LETF . A LETF -probability distribution over Σ is an assign-666
ment of probability values P to the elements of Σ that can be extended to a full667
probability function P ∶ L2 → R according to Definition 37.668
It is a common view that the classical truth-values true (1) and false (0)669
can be identified with the endpoints of probabilities in the unit interval [0,1].670
On the other hand, interpretations v ∶ L → {0,1} of a formal language L can671
be regarded as degenerate probability functions P ∶ L → [0,1]. The class of672
logics that make possible such an identification can be seen as a special case of673
probability logic. The standard view, however, is rather the opposite: it claims674
that probability logic presupposes, and so it depends on, classical logic.17 But675
the connection between logic and probability theory is far from being restricted676
to classical logic. The fact that probability distributions can be defined based on677
a non-classical consequence relation, in our view, makes clear that the relation678
between logic and probability goes beyond the realm of classical logic.679
4.1 Conditional probability680
The notion of conditional probability of α given β is defined as usual, for P (β) ≠ 0:681
P (α/β) = P (α ∧ β)
P (β)682
In terms of evidence, a statement P (α/β) is to be read as a measure of how683
much the evidence available for β affects the evidence for α.684
685
Some useful theorems of conditional probability of LETF -distributions are686
the following, with the caveat that P (β) ≠ 0 in all cases where P (α/β) is men-687
tioned:688
16Probability functions have been defined in this way for classical logic, for intuitionistic
logic without implication in Weatherson (2003), and for the paraconsistent logics Ci and Cie
in Bueno-Soler and Carnielli (2016, 2017).
17In a recent article, Demey et al. (2013) claim that “probability theory presupposes and
extends classical logic”, and leave aside all the attempts to combine probability theory with
non-classical logics. These attempts, however, not only do exist, but have also been successful
in combining probability theory with non-classical approaches to logical consequence. We
think Demey et al. are mistaken, not only because they ignore non-classical approaches to
probability logic, but also because they underestimate the view according to which classical
and some non-classical logics can be seen as special cases of probability logic. It is worth
noting that attempts to put together probability theory and non-classical logics can be traced
back to  Lukasiewicz (1913) and Tarski (1935).
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Theorem 39.689
The following properties hold when the probabilities in the denominators are690
different from 0.691
1. P (α1 ∧ ... ∧ αn) = P (α1/α2 ∧ ... ∧ αn)...P (αn−1/αn)P (αn) (Chain Rule).692
2. P (α/β ∧ γ) = P (α/γ)⋅P (β/α∧γ)
P (β/γ) .693
3. P (α ∧ β/γ) = P (α/γ) ⋅ P (β/α ∧ γ) = P (β/γ) ⋅ P (α/β ∧ γ).694
4. P (α ∨ β/γ) = P (α/γ) + P (β/γ) − P (α ∧ β/γ).695
5. P (α ∨ β/γ) = P (α/γ) + P (β/γ) if α and β are logically incompatible, i.e.,696
α ∧ β act as a  (see Section 4.2).697
6. P (α/β) + P (¬α/β) − P (●α/β) ≤ P (α ∨ ¬α/β).698
7. If P (○α) = 1, or equivalently P (●α) = 0, then P (α ∨ ¬α) = 1 and P (α ∧699 ¬α) = 0.700
8. P (α/β) + P (¬α/β) = 1, if P (○α) = 1.701
9. P (β/○β) + P (¬β/○β) = 1.702
Proof.703
Items 1 to 4 are quite elementary properties coming from the general704
definition of conditional probability: P (α/β) = P (α∧β)
P (β) , which gives the705
alternative product rule P (α ∧ β) = P (α/β) ⋅ P (β). The chain rule (item706
1) is derived by successive applications of product rule. Items 2 to 4 are707
easy consequences of the definition of conditional probability and clause 5708
of Definition 37.709
Item 5: since α∧β is a bottom particle in this case, P (α∧β) = 0, and the710
result follows from 4.711
Item 6 is a consequence of Fact 25 (α ∧ ¬α ⊢ ●α), Comparison and ele-712
mentary inequalities, plus the definition of conditional probability.713
Item 7: Easy consequence of Definition 22, R1 (Fact 24) and Comparison714
(Definition 35).715
Item 8: If P (○α) = 1, then by 9 P (α∨¬α) = 1, and by Lemma 40 (below)716
we have P ((α ∨ ¬α) ∧ β) = P (β) = P ((α ∧ β) ∨ (¬α ∧ β)) = P (α ∧ β) +717
P (¬α ∧ β) − P (α ∧ ¬α ∧ β). Since P (α ∧ ¬α ∧ β) = 0 (P (○α) = 1 implies718
P (α ∧ ¬α) = 0), we obtain P (β) = P (α ∧ β) + P (¬α ∧ β). Dividing both719
sides by P (β) obtains the result, in view of the definition of conditional720
probability.721
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Item 9: In LETF , ⊢ ○β ↔ ○β∧(β∨¬β)↔ (○β∧β)∨(○β∧¬β) (proof left to722
the reader). Thus P (○β) = P ((○β∧β)∨(○β∧¬β)) = P (○β∧β)+P (○β∧¬β)723
by Finite Additivity, since ○β ∧ β ∧ ¬β is a bottom particle (Fact 33).724
Dividing both sides by P (○β) yields the result.725
726
4.2 Independence and incompatibility727
Intuitively, two propositions are independent if the fact that one holds does728
not have any effect on whether or not the other holds, and vice-versa. Two729
propositions α and β, are said to be independent w.r.t. a distribution P if730
P (α ∧ β) = P (α) ⋅ P (β). Two propositions can be independent relative to731
one probability distribution and dependent relative to another. Alternatively,732
independence can be defined as follows: α is independent of β if P (α/β) = P (α)733
(or equivalently, P (β/α) = P (β)).18 Classically, α and ¬α are never independent734
(unless one of them has probability zero). In view of item 4 of Theorem 42735
below, P (α ∧ ¬α) ≤ P (●α), hence when P (α) ⋅ P (¬α) > P (●α), α and ¬α are736
not independent. In this way, P (●α) can be regarded as a bound on the ‘degree737
of independence’ between α and ¬α.738
Intuitively, two propositions α and β are logically incompatible if α cannot739
hold when β holds, and vice-versa. Two propositions α and β, are said to740
be logically incompatible if α,β ⊢ γ, for any γ, or equivalently, if α ∧ β is a741
bottom particle. Logically incompatible propositions α and β with non-zero742
probabilities are always dependent since 0 = P (α ∧ β) ≠ P (α) ⋅P (β). Again, for743
non-zero probabilities, classically α and ¬α are incompatible, and so dependent.744
In LETF , however, they are neither necessarily incompatible nor necessarily745
dependent, when P (○α) < 1. We saw in Fact 35 item 1 that α ∧¬α ∧ ○α as well746
as ○α∧●α defines a bottom particle in LETF . From clause 3 of Definition 37, it747
follows that for any probability distribution P , P (α ∧ ¬α ∧ ○α) = 0 and P (○α ∧748 ●α) = 0. So, in LETF α and ∼α are always logically incompatible and hence749
dependent, while α and ¬α can be independent.750
An interesting property concerning the behavior of probability measures in751
LETF , related to independence in ‘extreme cases’, occurs when P (α) = 1. In752
such cases α is independent from the probability measure of any other distinct753
proposition β. This kind of property contributes to the dynamics of evidence, in754
the sense of the interpretation of preservation of conclusive and non-conclusive755
evidence in LETF , in such a way that the increasing of conclusive evidence756
tends to truth.757
Lemma 40. Independence of propositions with maximal probability758
If P (α) = 1 then P (α ∧ β) = P (α) ⋅ P (β), for β ≠ α759
18Although mathematically equivalent to the former, this characterization of independence
by means of conditional probability is debatable, as shown in Fitelson and Ha´jek (2017),
where it is argued that the more general Popperian theory of conditional probability should
be adopted, leading to a revision of conventional insights about probabilistic independence.
The traditional notions are employed here for mathematical convenience.
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Proof. If P (α) = 1 then P (α ∨ β) = 1 from Comparison, since α ⊢ α ∨ β. By760
Finite Additivity 1 = P (α∨β) = P (α)+P (β)−P (α∧β). As P (α) = 1, it follows761
that P (α ∧ β) = P (β).762
The restriction α ≠ β in the above lemma intends to avoid the problematic cases763
of ‘self-independence’ of extreme events. As mentioned before, two events α764
and β are considered to be independent if P (α ∧ β) = P (α) ⋅ P (β), for some765
probability distribution P . This leads to a puzzling situation concerning events766
α such that P (α) = 0 or P (α) = 1. In such cases, P (α) = P (α∧α) = P (α) ⋅P (α)767
in both cases. In this way, extreme probabilities can be regarded as independent768
of themselves, an uncomfortable situation, as recognized in Fitelson and Ha´jek769
(2017).770
Lemma 40 leads immediately to the independence of consistent and incon-771
sistent propositions in extreme cases:772
1. If P (○α) = 1 then P (○α ∧ β) = P (β), for β ≠ ○α773
2. If P (●α) = 1 then P (●α ∧ β) = P (β), for β ≠ ●α774
3. If P (β) = 1 then P (○α ∧ β) = P (○α), for β ≠ ○α775
4. If P (β) = 1 then P (●α ∧ β) = P (●α), for β ≠ ●α776
Evidence can be increasing or decreasing in an historical series, leading to a dy-777
namic of evidence. This can be expressed in mathematical terms by elementary778
series. Let limi→∞Pi(α) = λmean that the sequence of values P1(α), P2(α),⋯, Pi(α)⋯779
is strictly monotonous and converges to λ ∈ [0,1].780
Lemma 41. The dynamics of evidence781
1. If limi→∞Pi(○α) = 1 or limi→∞Pi(●α) = 0, then limi→∞Pi(α ∨ ¬α) = 1782
and limi→∞Pi(α ∧ ¬α) = 0.783
2. If limi→∞Pi(○α) = 1 or limi→∞Pi(●α) = 0, then limi→∞(Pi(α)+Pi(¬α)) =784
1.785
Proof. Suppose limi→∞ Pi(○α) = 1; by PEM○ and Comparison, Pi(○α) ≤ Pi(α∨786 ¬α) ≤ 1. By the Squeeze Theorem of elementary calculus for series (aka the787
Sandwich Theorem) limi→∞Pi(α∨¬α) = 1. All other limits are proved in similar788
ways.789
The meaning of Lemma 41 is precisely that the values of Pi(○α) can be in-790
terpreted as degrees of classicality, in the sense that greater values of Pi(○α)791
indicate that the situation is approaching classicality and, conversely, the val-792
ues of Pi(●α) can be interpreted as degrees of anticlassicality, in the sense that793
smaller values of Pi(●α) indicate that the situation is approaching classicality.794
795
Some useful (though almost all immediate) properties of LETF -distributions796
are the following:797
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Theorem 42.798
1. If α ⊣⊢ β, then P (α) = P (β).799
2. P (α ∨ β) = P (α) + P (β), if α and β are logically incompatible.800
3. P (α∨β∨γ) = P (α)+P (β)+P (γ)−P (α∧β)−P (α∧γ)−P (β∧γ)+P (α∧β∧γ).801
4. P (α ∧ ¬α) ≤ P (●α).802
5. P (○α) ≤ P (α ∨ ¬α).803
6. P (○α) = 1 − P (●α).804
7. P (⊕α ∧ ¬α) = 0, P (∼α ∧ α) = 0.805
8. P (○α ∨ ●α) = 1, P (α ∨ ¬α ∨ ●α) = 1806
9. P (○α ∨ (α ∧ ¬α)) ≤ P (α ∨ ¬α)807
10. 1 + P ((α ∨ ¬α) ∧ ●α) = P (α ∨ ¬α) + P (●α)808
11. 1 + P ((α ∧ ¬α) ∨ ○α) = P (α ∧ ¬α) + P (○α)809
12. If P (○α) = 1 (or equivalently P (●α) = 0), then P (¬α) = 1 − P (α)810
13. If P (○α) = 1 (or equivalently P (●α) = 0), then P (α ∨ ¬α) = 1 and P (α ∧811 ¬α) = 0.812
Proof. Routine, from the axioms of probability and the derivability relation of813
LETF . We just sketch the proof of items 12 and 13. For 12, suppose P (○α) = 1;814
by items 4 and 5 above, PEM○, and Comparison, 1 = P (○α) ≤ P (α∨¬α), and815
P (α ∧ ¬α) ≤ P (●α) = 0, hence by Finite Additivity P (α ∨ ¬α) + P (α ∧ ¬α) =816
1 + 0 = P (α) + P (¬α). Hence P (¬α) = 1 − P (α). For 13 a similar reasoning as817
of 12 is obtained.818
Items 1 and 2 are usual results in probabilistic logic, and 3 is a particular819
case of the Inclusion-Exclusion property for finite probability, easily adapted820
for propositions, that hold for arbitrary finite disjunctions (see Grinstead and821
Snell (1997)). Items 4 and 5 establish constraints on the values of P (○α),822
P (α) and P (¬α). Item 7 concerns bottom particles, and 8, theorems of LETF823
essential for proving total probability theorems (Section 4.3 below). Items 12824
and 13 show the classical behavior of probabilities when P (○α) = 1.825
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4.3 Total probability theorems for LETF826
In the classical approach to probability, total probability theorems compute
the probability of an event β in a sample space partitioned into exclusive and
exhaustive events. Typically, for a partition in two pieces, a total probability
theorem that reflects excluded middle assumes the following form:
P (β) = P (β ∧ α) + P (β ∧ ¬α).
Here, however, we are not really talking about sample spaces, about events827
themselves, but rather about the information related to such events, that we call828
an information space. In the standard approach to probability theory, we start829
from a group of events, say, the two outcomes of tossing a coin, and attribute830
probabilities to these events, whose sum is always equal to 1. Let α express that831
the toss of a coin comes up heads. The sample space is thus divided into two832
parts, α and ¬α, corresponding respectively to heads and tails (not heads). If833
the coin behaves as expected, their probability are the same.834
On the other hand, we consider here a language that is able to express in-835
formation about some event – for example, the result of a referendum – that836
comes from different sources and may be unreliable. Such information is consti-837
tuted by evidence for ‘yes’ and for ‘no’ that can be non-conclusive, incomplete,838
contradictory, more reliable or less reliable, and perhaps even conclusive. Let839
α express the result ‘yes’, and ¬α the result ‘no’. In this case, the propositions840
we are concerned with are α,¬α, ○α, ●α, as well as other propositions of the841
language of LETF formed from them, for example, ●α ∨ α, α ∧ ¬α, ○α ∧ α, etc.842
A LETF -probability distribution attributes values to these propositions. The843
information space is thus constituted by such propositions and the measures844
of probabilities attributed to them by a LETF -probability distribution P. Note845
that, contrary to the classical case, P (α) + P (¬α) can be greater or less than846
1 precisely because α and ¬α do not establish a partition of the information847
space.848
Now, the question is: since we cannot rely on the classical, mutually exclusive849
partitions of the sample space, how can total probability theorems be stated? In850
order to provide such theorems for LETF , we have to rely on the connectives ○,851 ●, and on the connectives defined in Fact 34. We also need a bit of terminology.852
Definition 43. (Cleavage)853
Let us call a cleavage a (finite) family of propositions {α1, α2, ..., αn}. A cleavage854
is said to be exhaustive if α1∨α2∨ ...∨αn is a tautology, and so it covers all the855
information space, possibly with intersections. A cleavage is said to be exclusive856
when α1 ∨ α2 ∨ ... ∨ αn are pairwise logically incompatible. In this case, it does857
not yield intersection of information (in the sense that αi ∧ αj for i ≠ j is a858
bottom particle), and possibly does not cover the whole space. An exhaustive859
and exclusive cleavage is a partition.860
Items 2 to 5 of Theorem 36 cleave the information space exhaustively but not861
exclusively. Items 1 and 6, on the other hand, cleave the information space862
in parts that are exhaustive and exclusive, and so they are partitions. Notice863
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that item 3 of Theorem 36 corresponds to the six scenarios of conclusive and864
non-conclusive evidence that we have seen in Section 3.1. These scenarios can865
be graphically represented as follows:866 ●α ∧ α ●α ∧ ¬α ●α ●α ∧ (α ∧ ¬α) ○α ∧ α ○α ∧ ¬α
1 2 3 4 5 6
867
Item 1 of Theorem 36 above emphasizes the division between non-conclusive868
evidence (scenarios 1 to 4) and conclusive evidence (scenarios 5 and 6), while869
item 6, in addition, splits the conclusive evidence into truth (5) and falsity870
(6). These propositions can be understood as expressing different ways we can871
look at the information space. The following total probability theorems can be872
obtained depending upon certain cleavages, based on Theorem 36.873
Theorem 44. Total probability theorems874
1. P (β) = P (β ∧ ○α) + P (β ∧ ●α), w.r.t. the cleavage {○α, ●α}.875
2. P (β) = P (β ∧α)+P (β ∧¬α)+P (β ∧●α)−P (β ∧α∧●α)−P (β ∧¬α∧●α),876
w.r.t. the cleavage {α,¬α, ●α}.877
3. P (β) = P (β ∧ ○α ∧ α) + P (β ∧ ○α ∧ ¬α) + P (β ∧ ●α) − P (β ∧ ●α ∧ α ∧ ¬α),878
w.r.t. cleavage {●α ∧ α, ●α ∧ ¬α, ●α, ●α ∧ α ∧ ¬α, ○α ∧ α, ○α ∧ ¬α}.879
4. P (β) = P (β∧α)+P (β∧¬α)+P (β∧⊖α)−P (β∧α∧⊖α)−P (β∧¬α∧⊖α),880
w.r.t. the cleavage {α,¬α,⊖α}.881
5. P (β) = P (β ∧α)+P (β ∧¬α)+P (β ∧≈α)−P (β ∧α∧≈α)−P (β ∧¬α∧≈α),882
w.r.t. the cleavage {α,¬α,≈α}.883
6. P (β) = P (β∧⊕α)+P (β∧∼α)+P (β∧●α), w.r.t. the cleavage {⊕α,∼α, ●α}.884
Proof. 1. β ⊣⊢ (β ∧ ○α) ∨ (β ∧ ●α). So, P (β) = P ((β ∧ ○α) ∨ (β ∧ ●α)) =885
P (β ∧○α)+P (β ∧●α)−P (β ∧○α∧●α) = P (β ∧○α)+P (β ∧●α). The remaining886
proofs are left to the reader. In view of Definition 3.1 (connectives ⊕, ∼, ⊖, ≈),887
some of these cleavages are equivalent.888
889
4.4 Bayes’ rule890
As is well-known, Bayes’ rule, or Bayes’ theorem, computes the probability of891
an event based on previous information related to that event. The standard892
Bayes’ rule proves that, for P (β) ≠ 0:893
P (α/β) = P (β/α) ⋅ P (α)
P (β)894
In the equation above, interpreted in terms of measures of evidence rather than895
standard probabilities, P (α) denotes the evidence available for α without taking896
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into consideration any evidence for β. The latter is supposed to affect someway897
the evidence for α, and so P (α/β) is the measure of the evidence for α after898
β is taken into account. P (β/α), usually called the ‘likelihood’ in probability899
theory, is the evidence for β when α is considered as given, and P (β), usually900
called the ‘marginal likelihood’, is the total evidence available for β, that takes901
into account all the possible cases where β may occur. In what follows, we902
define some relevant versions of Bayes’ rule. Differently from the classical case,903
these versions are not equivalent. They show how the notion of classicality can904
modify Bayesian probability updating.905
Theorem 45. Bayes’ Conditionalization Rules906
907
1.
P (α/β) = P (β/α) ⋅ P (α)
P (β/○α) ⋅ P (○α) + P (β/●α) ⋅ P (●α)908
for P (β) ≠ 0, P (○α) ≠ 0, and P (●α) ≠ 0.909
Proof. From the definition of conditional probability and Theorem 44,910
item 1.911
2.912
P (α/β) = P (β/α) ⋅ P (α)P (β/α) ⋅ P (α) + P (β/¬α) ⋅ P (¬α) + P (β/●α) ⋅ P (●α)−
P (β/α ∧ ●α) ⋅ P (α ∧ ●α) − P (β/¬α ∧ ●α) ⋅ P (¬α ∧ ●α)913
for P (β) ≠ 0, P (α ∧ ●α) ≠ 0, and P (¬α ∧ ●α) ≠ 0.914
Proof. From the definition of conditional probability and Theorem 44,915
item 2.916
3.917
P (α/β) = P (β/α) ⋅ P (α)
P (β/⊕α) ⋅ P (⊕α) + P (β/∼α) ⋅ P (∼α) + P (β/●α) ⋅ P (●α)918
for P (β) ≠ 0, P (●α) ≠ 0, P (⊕α) ≠ 0, and P (⊖α) ≠ 0.919
Proof. From the definition of conditional probability and Theorem 44,920
item 6.921
It should be clear that the process of limit can be easily established for the above922
formulations of Bayes’ rules. If lim Pi(○α) = 1 (or equivalently lim Pi(●α) = 0)923
then item 1 above reduces to P (○α/β) = 1. Analogously, if lim Pi(●α) = 0 (or924
equivalently lim Pi(○α) = 1), then items 2 and 3 above reduce to the standard925
form of Bayes’ rule.926
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5 Final remarks927
This paper has been conceived to be a further development of the approach928
to paraconsistency as preservation of evidence presented in Carnielli and Ro-929
drigues (2017, 2019), where an interpretation of contradictions in terms of non-930
conclusive evidence was proposed. The underlying assumption is that there are931
no true contradictions, but rather argumentative contexts in which conflicting932
evidence, as well as the absence of any evidence, may occur. The valuation933
semantics is able to express only that there is or there is not evidence for a934
proposition α, while the probabilistic semantics presented here intends to ex-935
press the degree of evidence enjoyed by a given proposition. The acceptance of936
scenarios in which P (α) + P (¬α) > 1, however, does not mean that there may937
be something like ‘contradictory sample spaces’, or ‘contradictory probabilistic938
spaces’. The latter would be the probabilistic counterpart of contradictions in939
reality, a view on paraconsistency not endorsed by us. In our view, it is the940
information available about some collection of events that can be contradictory.941
So, instead of talking about sample spaces, the concept of an information space942
has been introduced here.943
Both LETJ and LETF are Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Undeter-944
minedness suitable for an intuitive interpretation in terms of preservation of945
evidence and truth. The intuition regarding ○ and ● as ‘classically contradic-946
tory’ w.r.t. each other had already been presented in Carnielli, Coniglio, and947
Rodrigues (2019, Section 4.4). LETF , however, as far as we know, is the first948
formal system where these connectives are both primitive and have the deduc-949
tive behavior given by rules Cons and Comp, that are in some sense analogous950
to explosion and excluded middle. The connective ●, and the fact that ○α ∨ ●α951
and α∨¬α∨●α are theorems of LETF , are essential for proving total probability952
theorems and Bayes’ rules (Theorems 44 and 45).953
The probabilistic semantics of LETF has been axiomatically stated in defi-954
nitions 37 and 38. Accordingly, P (α)+P (¬α) can be greater or less than 1, and955
this is interpreted as scenarios, respectively, of conflicting evidence, and little956
or no evidence. When P (○α) = 1, the classical behavior of P (α) and P (¬α) is957
restored, and this is interpreted as saying that the evidence available for α and958 ¬α is subjected to the laws of standard probability theory. But P (○α) may be959
less than 1, and in this case, according to the axioms, it expresses the degree to960
which P (α) and P (¬α) are expected to behave classically (the value of P (○α)961
establishes constraints on the values of P (α∨¬α) and P (α∧¬α), cf. Lemma 41).962
Accordingly, P (○α) < 1 can be intuitively interpreted as expressing the reliabil-963
ity of the available evidence for α and ¬α: greater reliability corresponds to a964
greater degree of classicality.965
Our treatment here does not intend to express degrees of belief by means966
of probability measures. The notion of evidence for α, as explained in Section967
2.2.1, does not imply belief in α. So, the degree of evidence for α measured968
by a statement P (α) =  is not a measure of the belief of an agent in α. How-969
ever, nothing a fortiori prevents the formal system proposed here, together with970
its probabilistic semantics, of being interpreted, or used, as a tool to measure971
31
degrees of belief, uncertainty, or some other relation between agents and propo-972
sitions. Similar remarks apply to the connective ○. In P (○α) = , the value973
of  expresses the degree to which it is expected that P (α) behaves classically.974
Indeed,  can also be interpreted as the degree of reliability of evidence for975
α, coherence with previous data or with a historical series of measures of evi-976
dence for α, or even with a subjective ingredient, for example, as the degree of977
trustfulness of the belief in α, or certainty/uncertainty of α.978
The rules for ○ and ●, due to their dual character, show a symmetry that979
deserves to be further investigated from the proof-theoretic point of view. There980
are some extensions of LETJ and LETF that also deserve to be studied. The981
operator ● and the rules Cons and Comp can be added to LETJ , obtaining982
a logic that differs from LETF only in the implication for the non-classical983
propositions. Two intuitively appealing equivalences are the following:984
1. ○α ⊣⊢ ○○α985
2. ○α ⊣⊢ ○¬α986
It was shown in Carnielli and Rodrigues (2017, Fact 17) that LETJ has no987
theorems of the form ○α (the same result also holds for LETF ), and it was988
argued that LETJ (and so LETF ) was conceived in such a way that ○ has to be989
introduced from outside the formal system. This is in line with the idea that990
information about conclusive evidence for a proposition α comes from outside991
the formal system. But it is also very reasonable to suppose that once the truth992
value of a proposition α has been established, and so ○α holds and α has classical993
behavior, then ○α, ○○α, and so on, also have classical behavior. Conversely, it is994
also reasonable to conclude ○α from ○○α, and so on. These ideas are expressed995
by 1 above. The equivalence 2 above makes explicit inside the system the first996
part of the result achieved by Fact 31 (to wit: once ○¬nα is proved, and so it997
follows that ¬nα is subjected to classical logic, for any formula ¬mα, m ≥ 0,998 ¬mα is also subjected to classical logic). Valuation semantics for these rules999
are straightforward, and adding these rules would produce a decidable formal1000
system.1001
We believe that the probabilistic semantic relation presented in Section 41002
will succeed as a tool for dealing with real argumentative contexts, including in-1003
vestigative scenarios and databases concerned with different degrees of evidence1004
attributed to propositions. But this claim needs to be further investigated.1005
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